Haitian Immigrants: Political Refugees or Economic Escapees? by Dernis, Martin M.
University of Miami Law Review 
Volume 31 Number 1 Article 3 
10-1-1976 
Haitian Immigrants: Political Refugees or Economic Escapees? 
Martin M. Dernis 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr 
Recommended Citation 
Martin M. Dernis, Haitian Immigrants: Political Refugees or Economic Escapees?, 31 U. Miami L. Rev. 27 
(1976) 
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol31/iss1/3 
This Leading Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of 
Law Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review by an authorized 
editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact 
library@law.miami.edu. 
HAITIAN IMMIGRANTS: POLITICAL REFUGEES OR
ECONOMIC ESCAPEES?
MARTIN M. DERNIS*
The article examines the recent immigration of Haitians to
the United States and their claims for political asylum. Pointing
to the present political situation in Haiti, the author takes issue
with the United States Government's official position that these
aliens are merely economic escapees, rather than refugees enti-
tled by international agreement to political asylum. In analyzing
the Haitian experience, the author also deals with the problems
associated with deportation proceedings and the alien's right to
counsel, employment authorization for aliens, and fraudulent
marriages. While these latter problems may not be unique to
Haitian immigrants, they have become particularly salient in
light of the Government's contention that these aliens are eco-
nomic escapees.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the past 5 years, increasing numbers of Haitian immigrants
have attempted illegal entry into the United States.' Contending
that they face probable arrest and persecution if returned to Haiti,
these aliens have sought asylum as political refugees;2 but the Immi-
* B.A., J.D., LL. M., University of Miami, Coral Gables, Florida. Member, The Florida
Bar.
1. The Haitians have frequently arrived in South Florida by way of overloaded sail and
fishing boats, in one case undertaking the hazardous 800-mile voyage with 38 people crowded
into a 20-foot boat. CHRISTIAN CENTURY, Feb. 27, 1974, at 219. On August 29, 1976, more than
150 Haitians sailed into Miami on a boat of only 50 feet. Miami Herald, Aug. 30, 1976, § B,
at 1, col. 1.
2. Miami Herald, July 1, 1976, § B, at 2, col. 1.
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gration and Naturalization Service and the United States Depart-
ment of State maintain that the immigrants are actually fleeing
Haiti's wretched economic conditions rather than any political re-
pression.' Thus, the factual question in these cases is whether the
Haitian aliens are political refugees or merely economic escapees,
while the accompanying legal issue is one of defining and differen-
tiating the terms, "political refugee" and "economic escapee." An-
other question posed by the plight of the Haitians is whether an
alien who originally leaves his country as an economic escapee can
become entitled to political asylum upon his arrival in this country
as a result of the possible political repercussions he would face were
he to be returned to his native land.
The term "refugee," as defined in the Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees, refers to one who
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the
protection of that country. .... I
An alien from a Communist-dominated country usually has no diffi-
culty in establishing such a fear of persecution. Immigration offi-
cials appear willing to presume that he is indeed a political refugee,
as in the case of the many Cubans who have entered the United
States since the Castro regime came to power. Where an alien flees
from a country not ruled by a Communist-controlled government,
however, these officials demand greater proof of a legitimate fear of
political repression. Matters are further complicated when, as in
Haiti, the economic conditions are as deplorable as the political
situation, so that aliens from such a country might as easily be
political or economic escapees, or both.
Although license plates proclaim Haiti "The Pearl of the An-
tilles," the country is hopelessly impoverished, with unemployment
as high as 30-50 percent and per capita wages as low as $1.30 per
day.' The nation's political climate appears to be equally dismal.
3. Id.
4. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. I, para. 2, done Jan. 31, 1967, 606
U.N.T.S. 2681 [hereinafter cited as Protocol]. This language is incorporated in the Protocol
by reference to the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 1, para. 2, done July
28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, 152 [hereinafter cited as Convention].
5. Greve, Is It Persecution or Poverty That Makes a Haitian Flee?, Miami Herald, Mar.
6,1974, § A, at 12, col. 1.
[Vol. 31:27
HAITIAN IMMIGRANTS
Affidavits of Haitian immigrants and statements of observers indi-
cate that, notwithstanding the posture of the United States Govern-
ment to the contrary, little positive change toward freedom has
occurred since the 24-year-old "President for life," Jean Claude
Duvalier, succeeded his father in 1971.6 Haitian aliens arriving in
6. Open letter by Antoine Adrien, 915 Putnam Ave., Brooklyn, N.Y., June 28, 1974.
My name is Antoine Adrien. I am Haitian and also a catholic Priest working
with the Haitian Community in New York since December 1971. Through daily
contacts with Haitians coming from or going to Haiti, including priests and sis-
ters, and because I do maintain close bonds with my country, 'reading [sicl all
the literature related to it, I am well aware of what is going on in the Western
part of the Island. [Haiti comprises the western half of a Caribbean Island, the
eastern portion of which is the Dominican Republic.]
A number of refugees are persons who have well-founded fear of persecution
because of membership in a particular group or because of the expression of
political opinions opposing the government. A considerable number have a well-
founded fear of persecution on a political basis even though they did not belong
to a particular group or express political opinions opposing the government.
Appropriation, without payment, by government officials or Tonton-
Macoutes of the merchandise, land, housing and other property is widespread;
and when the owners protest, they are threatened, arrested, tortured and often
killed. Other arbitrary actions by the Macoutes and government officials are the
arrest and torture of persons who happen to be present when destruction of, or
injury to government property occurs- for example, when a ship suffers damage
or sinks.
Even though the individual involved may actually not have been opposed to
the government, what is decisive is that the government treats him as an oppo-
nent. In every sense, such a person is a refugee with a well-founded fear of persecu-
tion because of his opinions, actual or imputed.
The Tonton Macoutes, as well as the Leopards, are in every basic respect
government instrumentalities. It is true that many actions of the Tonton-
Macoutes (their seizure of the property of others, for example) are initiated with-
out prior directives or sanction by government authorities, except where they
involve other Macoutes, government officials or very influential persons. In gen-
eral, under the prevailing conditions in Haiti, for the mass of people the distinc-
tion between the Macoutes or Leopards and the government is practically nil.
Some reporters do give Baby Doc rather good marks, claiming that "he is
considerably less ruthless and corrupt than his notorious father." Because of my
personal experience of the Duvaliers' regime, (I had been living for 12 years under
its rules), I am able to understand quite well the reality which is behind the facade
of the so-called "liberalization." I agree totally with this affirmation quoted from
CHRISTIAN CENTURY: "No appreciable change has come about in Haiti since
dictator Francois (Papa Doc) Duvalier died in 1971 and was succeeded by his
playboy son, Jean-Claude (Baby Doc), as "president for life at age 19 . . ..
Haiti's "tranquillity" is largely a surface phenomenon .. .repression and offi-
cially sanctioned terrorism-carried out by the dreaded Tonton-Macoutes and a
newer, U.S. trained force called the Leopards- remain the order of the day."
(Christian Century, Feb. 27, 1974).
/s/ Antoine Adrien c.s.sp.
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this country continue to tell horror stories of the torturous results
of belonging to anti-government groups,7 privately speaking with
disfavor about the government,' attempting to receive payment for
services rendered to a member of the Tonton-Macoutes (secret po-
lice),9 or merely bumping into a Macoute on the street."' In addition,
the taking of personal property at will by the Tonton-Macoutes is a
common occurrence.1
7. Affidavit of Josephat Louis, Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at A-3, Pierce v. United
States, case no. 75-1579 (5th Cir.).
On Jan. 13, 1973, at 11 a.m., I and my cousin, Germilis were walking on the Rue
St. Matin. We were going to a nearby house where our group kept some of our
papers hidden. My cousin had blank paper in his hand to be printed up later. We
were stopped by a Macoute I knew by sight and name, Papoi Joseph. He saw the
papers in my cousin's hand and accused him of belonging to a secret group. My
cousin denied this and they began fighting. Papoi Joseph pulled a gun and
threatened to kill my cousin if he did not confess. My cousin admitted he belonged
to a group. At the time the gun was pulled I ran behind some trees and watched.
After my cousin confessed Papoi Joseph shot him in the stomach and threw the
body in the ocean which was nearby.
See also Affidavit of Sabito St. Armand, id. at A-10.
8. Affidavit of Pierre Roosevelt, id. at A-13.
On August 12, 1973, my father and I were talking . . . saying that the new
president Duvalier is a child and that he cannot run the country. At midnight,
August 13, two Tonton Macoutes . . . came to my house in Port au Prince, and
took my father away. I have not seen or heard of him since then.
See also Affidavit of Francois Rilien, id. at A-14.
9. Affidavit of Joseph Etienne, id. at A-16 to -18.
I was a school teacher in a small private school. . . in Mathieu, Haiti. A Macoute
• . . had his seven year old girl enrolled there, and hadn't paid for her attendance
in four months. . . . I gave that girl a bill for the money owed me, and said that
if it wasn't paid she wouldn't be allowed to attend any more. The next day three
Macoutes . . . arrested me and took me to a prison called "Fort Dimanche."
In prison I was given dried bread, grits and water once each day, in a cell by
myself. After nine months, I still had with me the equivalent of $200 dollars, and
on February 14, 1973 I paid this to the guard . . . [to] get myself released.
[In August] I re-opened the school and that morning, the same Macoute who had
arrested me before . . . came in with his machine gun and threatened to kill me.
At this point some of the children began to shout, and when the Macoute turned
to quiet them, I picked up a chair and hit the Macoute over the head, knocking
him out.
10. Affidavit of Josephat Louis, id. at A-2.
In June of 1972 1 was arrested for accidentally bumping into a uniformed Macoute
on Portaille St. Joseph in Port-au-Prince. I was taken to the Penitencier National
and beaten with a stick by the man who arrested me. I was put in a cell and held
for 3 months.
11. Open letter by Raymond Alcide Joseph, 808 West End Ave., New York, N.Y., June
28, 1974.
The Tonton-Macoutes, as well as the more recently organized "Leopards,"
are in every basic respect government instrumentalities. It is true that many
[Vol. 31:27
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Thus, while Haitian aliens certainly stand to benefit econom-
ically by admission into the United States, they also seek to gain
freedom from political and social repression. Just as the political
hardships of a nation should not be used as an artificial means to
justify economic motives, neither should immigration officials deny
political asylum to an alien simply because he comes to this country
from a situation of abject poverty. While it is no doubt true that
some Haitian aliens are political neutrals whose only motive for
leaving their homeland is economic, it is apparent that most of these
immigrants fear for their lives if they are deported home. Such fears,
as well as the incidents which give rise to them, should bring the
Haitians within the protective parameters of the Protocol. 2 Accord-
ingly, it is preferable from both the legal and moral viewpoints that
no Haitian be returned to his native country unless he clearly has
no basis for fearing either the Duvalier government or its local
strong-arm men, who terrorize the towns and villages.
II. DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS AND THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
A. Nature of Deportation Proceedings
Proceedings to determine the deportability of a resident alien
commence with the issuance of an order to show cause,' which must
contain a statement of the nature of the proceeding, the legal au-
thority for the proceeding, the factual basis for the charges, and a
requirement that the alien appear at a hearing to show cause why
he should not be deported. 4 In addition, specified officials of the
Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) are empowered to
issue warrants for arrest "whenever, in [their] discretion, it ap-
pears that the arrest of the respondent is necessary or desirable."'
Warrantless arrests may be made by any officer of the INS who
actually witnesses an illegal entry into the United States or has
actions of the Tontons-Macoutes (seizure of property without compensation, etc.)
are initiated without prior directives or sanction by higher government officials.
However, their actions are later invariably approved by the authorities, except
where they involve other Macoutes, government officials or very influential per-
sons. In general, under the prevailing conditions in Haiti, for the mass of people
the distinction between the Macoutes or the Leopards and the government is
practically nonexistent.
12. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
13. 8 C.F.R. § 242.1(a) (1976).
14. 8 C.F.R. § 242.1(b) (1976).
15. 8 C.F.R. § 242.2(a) (1976).
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reason to believe that the alien is likely to escape before a warrant
can be obtained." In the latter case, the alien is to be taken "with-
out unnecessary delay" to an INS officer for examination. 7 Similar
to criminal arrests, the arrested alien is taken to a detention facility
and given Miranda-type warnings,'" then fingerprinted and photo-
graphed.' 9 Pending final determination of deportability, the ar-
rested alien may be (1) continued in custody, (2) released on bond
of not less than $500, or (3) released on conditional parole.2"
By the terms of the applicable statute, "no decision of deporta-
bility shall be valid unless it is based upon reasonable, substantial,
and probative evidence."'" The Supreme Court, however, has held
that Congress has not addressed itself to the question of degree of
proof required to establish deportability,22 and that the evidence
must be "clear, unequivocal, and convincing."2' :
B. Right to Counsel
Deportation proceedings are civil as opposed to criminal in na-
ture, and the courts have generally held that fundamental fairness
requires that the alien be afforded the opportunity to provide his
own counsel if he wishes," although this must be at no expense to
the government.25 If the opportunity to retain counsel is extended,
16. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2) (1970).
17. Id.
18. The alien is to be told that any statement he makes may be used against him and
that he has a right to be represented by counsel of his own choosing at no expense to the
Government. 8 C.F.R. § 242.2(a) (1976). To the extent that counsel will not be appointed for
the indigent, the warnings differ from standard Miranda warnings. Furthermore, since depor-
tation proceedings are civil in nature, rather than criminal, there is no requirement of
Miranda warnings as to constitutional rights. Avila-Gallegos v. INS, 525 F.2d 666, 667 (2d
Cir. 1975). An alien need not be given Miranda warnings in noncustodial interviews even
where the INS already possesses information indicating the alien's deportability and focuses
its investigation for this purpose. Chen v. INS, 45 U.S.L.W. 2049 (1st Cir. July 13, 1976).
Statements made without warning may be used against the alien at a deportation hearing
but not in a criminal matter, including a criminal charge of violating immigration laws.
Chavez-Raya v. INS, 519 F.2d 397 (7th Cir. 1975).
19. 8 C.F.R. § 242.4 (1976).
20. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1970).
21. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4) (1970).
22. Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 284 (1966).
23. Id. at 285. See also 8 C.F.R. § 242.14(a) (1976).
24. Nicoli v. Briggs, 83 F.2d 375 (10th Cir. 1936).
25. 8 C.F.R. § 242.2(a) (1975). Once the deportation hearing itself begins, the special
inquiry officer is to advise the alien of his right to counsel "and require him to state then
and there whether he desires representation .... " 8 C.F.R. § 242.16(a) (1976).
[Vol. 31:27
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but none is obtained, or counsel fails to appear, then the hearing
may proceed as scheduled."5 Unlike criminal proceedings it is not
"the guiding hand of counsel"" which is required, only the oppor-
tunity to obtain it.
In several cases deportation orders have been contested because
the alien had to proceed without counsel when he desired represen-
tation but lacked sufficient funds to obtain counsel." Wherever the
claim has been asserted that due process requires that counsel be
appointed for indigents, the courts have avoided confronting this
issue and have ruled that the alien was not prejudiced by the ab-
sence of counsel because the facts were undisputed, and the assist-
ance of counsel could not have benefited him." In other cases the
courts have found that the issue of indigency was not adequately
presented by the alien.'" Apparently these courts chose to overlook
the possibility that some facts may have been disputed or that
indigency might have been shown had the alien been provided coun-
sel to properly present his case.
The present state of the law regarding the right to counsel in
deportation proceedings is analogous to that prevailing in state
criminal prosecutions prior to Gideon v. Wainwright.' Although the
courts have refused to extend the absolute right to counsel guaran-
teed by the sixth amendment in criminal proceedings to deportation
cases,3" they have been willing to examine individual cases to deter-
mine whether the proceedings meet the tests of fundamental fair-
ness.3 The mere fact that the alien was unrepresented is not consid-
26. See Dengeleski ex rel. Saccardio v, Tillinghast, 65 F.2d 440 (1st Cir. 1933); United
States ex rel. Gould v. Uhl, 6 F. Supp. 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1934).
27. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
28. See, e.g., Murgia-Melendrez v. INS, 407 F.2d 207 (9th Cir. 1969). The courts have
also had to scrutinize denials of the right to counsel in cases where improper influence or
action was exercised by the government officials. Bon Youn Choy v. Barber, 279 F.2d 642 (9th
Cir. 1960) (alleged intimidation); Whitfield v. Hanges, 222 F. 745, 749-51 (8th Cir. 1915)
(refusal to permit counsel); Roux v. Commissioner of Immigration, 203 F. 413 (9th Cir. 1913)
(misleading alien as to the need for counsel); Barrese v. Ryan, 189 F. Supp. 449 (D. Conn.
1960) (no reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel and inadequate comprehension of the
language).
29. See, e.g., Henriques v. INS, 465 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 968
(1973); DeBernardo v. Rogers, 254 F.2d 81 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 816 (1958).
30. See, e.g., Rosales-Caballero v. INS, 472 F.2d 1158 (5th Cir. 1973).
31. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
32. Tupacyuparqui-Marin v. INS, 447 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1971).
33. Shaughnessy v. United States, 345 U.S. 206 (1953); see Jouras v. Allen, 222 F. 756
(8th Cir. 1915) Roux v. Commissioner of Immigration, 203 F. 413 (9th Cir. 1913).
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ered a denial of due process unless he can show prejudice thereby.:"
On the other hand, the courts have not been reticent to find unfair-
ness where the facts warrant it. 5
While no case has flatly held that counsel must be provided in
any specific situation, some decisions have approached that posi-
tion. For instance, in United States ex rel. Castro-Louzan v.
Zimmerman" the court stated:
Informing a prisoner with total resources of $30.00, a stranger in
a strange land with a complete lack of knowledge of the language
of that country, that he had a right to counsel is almost an empty
gesture ...
In a matter involving a person's liberty, it is my opinion that
we must look to the substance rather than the form [of the pro-
ceeding, whether civil or criminal]. . . . It would in my opinion
be a reflection upon the American system of jurisprudence if this
impecunious alien in the light of all the circumstances were to
have the legal consequences of deportation visited upon him
without having a full and complete opportunity to present for the
determination of the Immigration and Naturalization Service all
the facts adduced in the record before me.
37
At what point the right to counsel has such a distinct bearing
on the outcome of the case that the hearing becomes unfair is, of
course, a problematical but crucial question. It is precisely the in-
quiry which developed in the field of criminal law after Powell v.
Alabama," and which the Supreme Court sought to avoid in Gideon
v. Wainwright" when it rejected the "special circumstances" test of
34. DeBernardo v. Rogers, 254 F.2d 81 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 816 (1958).
35. See, e.g., Rose v. Woolwine, 344 F.2d 993 (4th Cir. 1965), where the court reopened
a deportation proceeding in which the alien had been represented by a "Travel Agent" rather
than a lawyer because the alien had not realized that the unrebutted evidence in the record
could result in her being barred permanently from the country. See also cases cited in note
28 supra.
36. 94 F. Supp. 22 (E.D. Pa. 1950).
37. Id. at 25-26.
38. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). Writing for the Court, Mr. Justice Sutherland stated:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not compre-
hend the right to be heard by counsel .... [The layman] lacks both the skill
and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have [sic] a
perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceed-
ings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of
conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence.
Id. at 68-69.
39. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
[Vol. 31:27
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Betts v. Brady." The Gideon court, through Mr. Justice Black,
argued that:
[R]eason and reflection require us to recognize that in our adver-
sary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who
is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless
counsel is provided for him. This seems to us to be an obvious
truth.4
It would seem that the impoverished Haitian immigrant, not
only too poor financially to hire counsel but also too poorly versed
in the English language to present his own case, as well as unable
to comprehend the legal system of the strange new land in which
he finds himself, is also in obvious need of legal representation. Yet,
as with the early development of right to counsel in criminal pro-
ceedings, right to counsel in immigration matters has continued to
be measured by the Betts "special circumstances" test. In view of
the ramifications of the deportation hearing and its results on the
future life of the alien, it would seem that such individuals should
be entitled to the benefit of counsel under the Gideon rationale.
This is all the more so where, as in the case of the Haitians, an
alien's right to remain in this country is primarily contingent on a
legal technicality-whether the social conditions in Haiti are such
that these people can legitimately qualify as political refugees as
defined in various international agreements."
III. EMPLOYMENT AUTHORIZATION
Various classes of aliens are barred from entry into the United
States because of economic factors. These include: (1) "paupers,
professional beggars, or vagrants";43 (2) those who "are likely at any
40. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
41. 372 U.S. at 344. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), where the Supreme
Court held that the right to counsel applies to all criminal matters including felonies, misde-
meanors, or petty offenses because of the far-reaching effects of any proceeding which makes
possible a loss of liberty on the part of the accused. See also Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S.
66, 73 (1970).
42. See text accompanying note 3 supra.
43. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(8) (1970). The statute does not define these terms, but they
generally are thought not to apply to the Haitians. "Pauper" is defined in the case law as
"one who is actually dependent upon public funds for support and who in addition is unable
by reason of mental or physical infirmity to work or is unwilling to work." In re M-, 2 I. & N.
Dec. 131, 132 (1944). A "vagrant" is one who is dependent on others for his support even
though capable of self-support. See Parshall v. State, 62 Tex. Crim. 177, 138 S.W. 759 (Crim.
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time to become public charges";" and (3) those seeking to enter the
country for the purpose of performing skilled or unskilled labor."'
With regard to this last class, the Secretary of Labor must certify
his findings prior to the alien's entry into the country. " It would
therefore appear that this requirement applies only to aliens coming
to the United States for the sole or primary purpose of performing
labor, rather than to all immigrants. Furthermore, it seems unrea-
sonable to expect a bona fide political refugee to first make an
application to the Secretary of Labor before fleeing the repressive
atmosphere of his homeland.
The right of the Haitians both to enter the United States and
to work once they are here hinges on the validity of their political
asylum claim.47 If they are bona fide political refugees, their rights
are governed by Article 17(1) of the Convention:
The Contracting States shall accord to refugees lawfully staying
in their territory the most favorable treatment accorded to na-
tionals of a foreign country in the same circumstances, as regards
the right to engage in wage-earning employment."
If, on the other hand, they are here for merely economic purposes,
App. 1911); City of Huntington v. Salyer, 135 W. Va. 397, 63 S.E.2d 575 (1951). The Haitians
are frequently penniless upon arrival in the United States, and are at first dependent on
support from others; but they are ready, willing, and able to take jobs and become self-
supporting. In fact, it is this eagerness to work which leads to the conclusion that they are
economic, rather than political, escapees.
44. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(15) (1970).
45. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14) (1970).
Aliens seeking to enter the United States, for the purpose of performing skilled
or unskilled labor, unless the Secretary of Labor has determined and certified to
the Secretary of State and to the Attorney General that (A) there are not suffi-
cient workers in the United States who are able, willing, qualified, and available
at the time of application for a visa and admission to the United States and at
the place to which the alien is destined to perform such skilled or unskilled labor,
and (B) the employment of such aliens will not adversely affect the wages and
working conditions of the workers in the United States similarly employed.
Thus, the Secretary of Labor must affirmatively find that a specific alien is entitled to
employment under the Act. Under the original form of the Act in 1952, however, the Secretary
certified those cases where an alien's entry into the country, and subsequently the job market,
would have negative effects on the market. Act of June 27, 1952, ch. 477, § 212(a)(14), 66
Stat. 182, as amended 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14) (1970).
46. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14) (1970).
47. See note 4 supra. See also Convention, art.17, para.1, which is incorporated by
reference into the Protocol, art. I, para. 1.




then they are seeking entry into the United States for the purpose
of performing skilled or unskilled labor and must comply with g
U.S.C. section 1182(a)(14) (1970). In the past few years the INS has
put the cart before the horse by routinely denying work authoriza-
tion to all Haitians, even before their asylum claims can be raised
at deportation hearings. The effect has been to place these aliens at
the mercy of others for support while their right to remain in this
country is determined."
The reason most often given for this blanket denial of work
authorization is that Haitians and other aliens would be taking jobs
that otherwise could be occupied by Americans.'" While at first
glance this may appear to be true, it has also been argued that such
immigrants usually secure jobs which Americans would not do.5
Moreover, the Dade County Federation of Labor early took the po-
sition that such aliens should be afforded the opportunity to earn a
livelihood, and that such opportunity would have no adverse effect
on those already working in Dade County.5" As a practical matter,
if these Haitians were to be authorized for employment there could
be two positive results: (1) they would be self-supporting rather
than having to rely on the charity of others, and (2) they could be
issued social security accounts and become taxpayers, rather than
illegally working for tax-free, substandard wages, as is now the case
with many aliens.
49. Although various religious and civic organizations (such as the Haitian Refugee
Center, the Christian Community Service Agency, and the National Council of Churches)
have attempted to provide the refugees with at least the bare necessities of food and shelter,
the burden is becoming too heavy. The funds available to these organizations have been
steadily dwindling and may soon be exhausted, in which event the Haitian refugees would
be cut off from any and all means of support.
50. Referring primarily to Haitians, Robert Woytych, District Director of the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service, stated: "[These people (aliens) are taking jobs from Amer-
ican citizens and permanent residents of this country." The Miami News, July 8, 1974, § A,
at 4, col. 1. Similarly, the District Director in Chicago, after supervising the arrests of 41
Polish cleaning women who were working without authorization, said: "[I]f I had the man-
power here I could make a lot more arrests . . . . I bet I could liberate 1,200 jobs a month
for Americans." The Miami News, March 12, 1975, § A, at 1, col. 3 (emphasis added).
51. Donald Dierman, an attorney for many of the Haitians, has said, "It is unfortunate
that this need (of the Haitians to work) should arise at a time of economic difficulty within
the United States . . . . However, most of the Haitians are able to accept jobs that Ameri-
cans have refused." The Miami News, Jan. 15, 1975, § A, at 4, col. 2. One alien stated that
he was working in a job which pays $3.00 per hour, but which no American would accept for
less than double that rate. The Miami News, July 8, 1974, § A, at 4, col. 2.
52. Open letter by E.T. Stephenson, President of Dade County Federation of Labor,
Nov. 26, 1972.
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When viewed from the purely legal perspective, there appears
to be no compelling reason why the Haitians cannot be allowed at
least a restricted form of access to gainful employment while await-
ing the disposition of their political asylum claims. Indeed, viewing
the situation in an objective light, the government has the Haitians
in custody, and consequently, the government has the constitu-
tional obligation of assuring them at least adequate means of subs-
istence in accordance with basic standards of decency." Moreover,
the Protocol and Convention prohibit harsh deprivations; and those
treaties, having the force of law, 4 mandate humanitarian treatment
of refugees and those persons presenting bona fide, unresolved
claims to that status. Forbidding the Haitians from seeking some
means of gainful employment seems to constitute such harsh treat-
ment. The Protocol and Convention prohibit a contracting state
from expelling or returning a refugee "in any manner whatsoever"
to the country he has fled.55 Indirect as well as direct means of
compulsory return are prohibited by this language. Yet it would
seem that the deprivations caused by the denial of employment
authorization are precisely such a means of compulsory return,
whether intended to be such or not. Thus, the Haitians should have
the protection of the international agreements against the indirect
means of compulsory return pending the final determination of their
status as refugees.
If it permits denial of employment authorization at all, 8
U.S.C. section 1252 (1970) does not permit a "policy" of denying
employment authorization to persons "who have not established
their claim to political asylum." Subsection (a) allows for alterna-
tive dispositions of a person "in the discretion of the Attorney Gen-
eral and pending such determination of deportability," and subsec-
tion (c) similarly allows for alternative dispositions of a person sub-
sequent to final orders of deportation "at the Attorney General's
53. The due process clause protects a person in the custody of the government from
unconscionably severe conditions. See Rhem v. Malcolm, 371 F. Supp. 594, 634 (S.D.N.Y.
1974), modified, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974); Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt,
360 F. Supp. 676, 688 (D. Mass. 1973), aff'd, 494 F.2d 1196 (lst Cir. 1974). The eighth
amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment may also be applicable even
to persons not under criminal judgments of guilt. See Johnson v. Lark, 365 F. Supp. 289, 301-
03 (E.D. Mo. 1973).
54. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606
U.N.T.S. 268, acquired the force of law by Proclamation 3822, 82 Stat. 1455 (1968).
55. Convention, art. 33, incorporated by reference in Protocol, art. I, para. 1.
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discretion." If read to embrace employment authorization, the stat-
ute clearly contemplates that such authorization may and should be
given in appropriate circumstances both before and after determi-
nation of deportability. Yet, the INS seems to have adopted a cate-
gorical principle of denial of employment authorization, rather than
exercising the claimed statutory discretion by determining whether
appropriate circumstances exist as to each Haitian.
The exercise of even discretionary power as to persons claiming
protection under the Protocol and Convention must, therefore, be
governed by the principles of humanitarianism and amelioration,
lest the intent of the United States in subscribing to the Protocol
and Convention be defeated. It seems hardly consistent with the
Protocol and Convention to deny the means of subsistence and to
force the Haitian refugees into dire poverty when their claims of
political asylum have not yet been finally determined.
IV. FRAUDULENT MARRIAGES
In order for an alien to enter and remain in the United States
by virtue of his marriage to a citizen, the marriage must be bona
fide, not a mere facade. " The standard frequently employed is that
the marriage must be both "valid" and "subsisting." In addition to
meeting all the requirements for a "valid" marriage under state law,
federal law disallows marriage by proxy between a United States
citizen and an alien abroad unless the marriage has been consum-
mated. 7 In order for the marriage also to be "subsisting," it must
be one in which the parties at the time of the wedding actually
intend to remain married and to fulfill all the marital obligations.
Judicial decisions have yet to delineate clearly what constitutes a
56. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(c) (1970).
57. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(35) (1970) provides:
The term "spouse," "wife," or "husband" do [sic] not include a spouse, wife or
husband by reason of any marriage ceremony where the contracting parties
thereto are not physically present in the presence of each other, unless the mar-
riage shall have been consummated.
However, the vast majority of Haitians are not affected by this requirement since few of them
are married by proxy prior to arrival in the United States.
58, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(c)(2) (1970) provides:
(c) An alien shall be deported .. .if...
(2) it appears to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that he or
she has failed or refused his or her marital agreement which in the
opinion of the Attorney General was hereafter made for the purpose
of procuring his or her entry as an immigrant.
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subsisting marriage. In Lutwak v. United States'! the Supreme
Court defined "subsistence" only vaguely in stating that "the two
parties have undertaken to establish a life together and assume
certain duties and obligations."" In United States v. Rubenstein,"
the Second Circuit defined what it is not: "[A] pretense, or cover,
to deceive others." 2 The courts have uniformly expressed the opin-
ion that a marriage entered into only for immigration purposes will
not be recognized unless it achieves the social objectives of a mar-
riage." Thus, even though the marriage is legally valid and binding,
it will not satisfy immigration requirements unless it is also subsist-
ing.
Aliens who are financially able to procure the services of a
marriage broker are carefully scrutinized by the INS, which utilizes
a practical procedure for testing the genuineness of a marriage.
Officials interview each husband and wife separately using a stan-
dard set of questions, covering such topics as the dinner menu,
apartment furnishings, bathroom tiles, and other specifics. "4 In
many cases the couples admit the sham nature of their marriages
when confronted with the discrepancies in their interview answers.
If they continue to maintain that they have a valid and subsisting
marriage, however, further investigation then will be undertaken in
order to ascertain whether they in fact live together. Proof that they
do not will provide a prima facie case for deportability. Other facts
which tend to indicate fraudulent intent are the involvement of a
marriage broker, the partners never having met before the wedding,
a great disparity in ages, and the partners never having intended to
remain married."5 Evidence which will tend to show a valid and
subsisting marriage includes love letters between the spouses, testi-
mony showing that they were actually acquainted prior to marriage,
and proof of cohabitation after the wedding.66 As in most other
aspects of the deportation proceeding, the burden of proof is on the
59. 344 U.S. 604 (1953).
60. Id. at 611.
61. 151 F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1945).
62. Id. at 919.
63. In re Slade, 10 I. & N. Dec. 128 (1962); In re M-, 8 I. & N. Dec. 217 (1958); see
United States v. Diogo, 320 F.2d 898 (2d Cir. 1963).
64. Miami News, July 8, 1974, § A, at 4, col. 3. The exact list of questions is not revealed
by the INS on the theory that prior knowledge would allow preparation.
65. United States v. Rubenstein, 151 F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1945).
66. In re Hayes, 1. & N. Dec. 2162 (1972).
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government to show by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence
that the marriage is a sham. 7
It is widely recognized in the south Florida area that the sham
marriage has become a common device for desperate aliens to ob-
tain permanent residence. Such marriages are sometimes arranged
by marriage brokers who command high fees. INS officials in Miami
report that as many as 80 percent of the marriages between United
States citizens and nonresident aliens turn out to be fraudulent. 8
While, of course, the sham marriage problem is not unique to Hai-
tian aliens, it would appear that this group's particular difficulties
in procuring asylum have made this alternative method of obtaining
permanent residence in the United States all the more attractive
and imperative. Although few Haitians upon their arrival in this
country possess sufficient resources to obtain the services of a mar-
riage broker, many of them have been able to secure employment
(without authorization) while awaiting the outcome of their asylum
claims. Such individuals usually work long hours for minimal pay,
and no employment records are kept. Funds thus acquired can be
frequently saved to acquire a broker's services. Notwithstanding the
high costs involved, the alien rarely gets what he seeks. While the
marriage certificates are legal, the marriage contracts themselves
are invalid since the husband and wife often never cohabit and
usually meet for the first time when they go for a blood test. If
caught, the alien risks not only deportation, but a prison term be-
forehand.
V. CONCLUSION
There are those who believe the Haitians are, for the most part,
fleeing their country for reasons of extreme poverty; yet their claims
of political and social persecution appear valid. It further appears
that the repression is widespread throughout Haiti, and not local-
ized in such a way that its victims could escape to other areas of
their country. Thus, the political asylum issue hinges on the extent
and degree of credence to be given the affidavits and other reports
of repression in Haiti. Perhaps it would be wise for the United States
government to undertake an extensive investigation of the actual
political situation in Haiti, so that Haitian aliens can receive a fair
analysis of their claims to asylum.
67. Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276 (1966).
68. Miami News, July 8, 1974, § A, at 4, col. 2.
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